Profit versus non-profit firms in the service sector: an analysis of the employment and welfare implications by Bonatti, Luigi et al.
ISTITUTO STUDI SVILUPPO AZIENDE NON PROFIT
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TRENTO
PROFIT VERSUS NON-PROFIT FIRMS IN
THE SERVICE SECTOR: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE EMPLOYMENT AND
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
by
Luigi Bonatti*, Carlo Borzaga* and Luigi Mittone*
Working paper n. 18
                                                          
* University of Trento
2Abstract
In the dynamic model presented in the paper, manufacturing and service
firms coexist. Two general equilibrium frameworks are compared, in which
the service-providing firms are for profit enterprises or, alternatively, non-
profit organizations. Unlike in the related literature, a non-profit firm has no
comparative advantage in dealing with the asymmetry arising from the fact
that customers do not know ex ante the quality of the service. The paper
shows that steady-state employment is higher when the service-providing
firms are non-profit organizations. Moreover, the steady state associated
with the presence of non-profit organizations is Pareto-superior if they enjoy
a significant advantage at motivating their employees.
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INTRODUCTION•
Scholars and policy-makers have recently paid closer attention to the
employment-creation potential of non-profit organizations – and not so much in the
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3USA, where the sector is well established, but in the European countries, where the
sector is significantly smaller in size, reputation and independence.
Whilst attention initially concentrated on the ability of non-profit
organizations to expand the supply of social services, mainly in favour of groups
suffering from social exclusion, in recent years interest has increasingly shifted to
the possibility that these organizations might help to create jobs. This possibility
was first officially considered in the Delors White Paper (European Commission,
1993) and was thereafter discussed by numerous European Commission
documents. As a result, the enlargement of the non-profit sector has been supported
by the European Social Fund and by a Specific Pilot Action aimed at evaluating its
employment potential (European Commission, 1999b). Finally, the development of
entrepreneurial non-profit organizations has been included among the guidelines
that the member States must follow in preparing their Employment National Action
Plans.
To date, these policies have not given rise to substantial scientific debate,
although the literature contains arguments -- both theoretical and empirical  -- for
and against their efficacy. Of the empirical arguments in favour of the employment
potential of the non-profit sector, the most important is the growth observed in the
number of new non-profit organizations and related employment (Salamon and
Anheier, 1995 and 1996). This growth has taken place mainly in the sector of
personal, social and community care services -- which is the sector in which most
4non-profit organizations operate, and which is underdeveloped in most European
Countries compared to the size of its equivalent in the United States (European
Commission, 1999a). High demand, both latent and explicit, for social and
community care services strengthens the conviction that the bulk of new jobs
should be created in this sector and, consequentrly, by non-profit organizations,
which are particularly suited to operating in it.
The employment potential of non-profit sector can also be supported by
theoretical arguments. Several explanations of the existence of non-profit
organizations seek to demonstrate that their characteristics (mainly the non-profit
distribution constraint) reduce the market or contractual costs associated with some
sort of market failure specific to the good or the service produced. In particular, the
literature has emphasized the relevance of the information aymmetry between
consumer and producer (Hansmann, 1980 and 1996; Ben-Ner, 1986; Ben-Ner and
van Hoomissen, 1991). Other explanations seek to demonstrate that non-profit
organizations exist to satisfy the demand for public goods that the government does
not provide because they do not fit demand by the median voter (Weisbrod, 1977
and 1988). In both cases it is possible to conclude that, in the sectors in which the
non-profit organizations operate, the level of employment is positively correlated
with the number of such organizations because they provide goods or services that
would not be provided (at least in the same quantity and quality) by other types of
organizations.
5These arguments in favour of the employment potential of the non-profit
organizations are matched by various arguments against it. Indeed, one may argue
that the the extra employment created by such organizations crowds out an equal
volume of employment created by the public sector or by for-profit firms,
especially in view of the fact that the non-profit organizations appear to be closely
dependent on public funding and tax relief. It is often added that they survive and
grow because they derive comparative advantages from wages and working
conditions worse than those applied by other organizations, in particular those
employing public employees: in the absence of such advantages their net
contribution to the level of employment would be null (or even negative).
Also the theoretical arguments in support of the job creation potential of
non-profit organizations have been criticized. The contention by Hansmann (1980)
that those who exercise control over a non-profit organization – unlike the owners
of for-profit firms -- gain no advantage from exploiting any superior information
that they may possess concerning product quality, since the organization is barred
from distributing its net earnings, has been criticized from several points of view. It
implicitly assumes, in fact, that the interests of those in control of a non-profit
organization coincide perfectly with the interests of each consumer who buys its
service. But this is not in general true. On one hand, the interest of the individual
consumer is that infinite care, attention and effort – all resources that are in limited
supply – should be devoted to her/him in exchange for a price as low as possible.
6On the other hand, a resource constraint applies to every organization, even to a
non-profit organization genuinely committed to its “mission” of delivering its
service in that combination of quality and quantity which maximize the discounted
sequence of utilities which its representative customer can obtain by consuming it
in the course of time.  Therefore, also a non-profit organization has an incentive to
increase its revenues in order to improve the combination of quantity and quality of
the service that it provides. Indeed, if this kind of organization must compete in the
marketplace and rely only on the revenues obtained by selling its services to
consumers in order to survive and carry out its mission, its interests do not coincide
with those of any consumer. In other words, a non-profit organization with these
characteristics has an incentive to charge a price for its services which is not
justified by their quality content. Hence, consumers cannot be certain ex ante about
the quality of a service: the non-profit distribution constraint – in itself  -- does not
suppress the incentive to exploit the information asymmetry to the advantage of
those delivering the service. This implies that a non-profit organization must
establish a reputation for being non-exploitative of consumers in exactly the same
way as a for-profit provider of services must do so in order to overcome
information asymmetry (see Ortmann, 1996).1
                                                          
1 Moreover, Hansmann’s theory tends to explain a donative non-profit organization, where
the trust relations with the donors are crucial, better than a commercial or productive non-
profit one (the so-called social enterprise) providing private merit goods whose quality can
be tested by the consumers (as is the case of most of the services provided by the
organizations that the European policies intend to promote).
7This short discussion demonstrates that European policies to increase the
employment potential of the non-profit sector have been insufficiently supported
by economic analysis, at both the macro and micro levels. The aim of this paper is
to make a contribution in this direction by assessing whether and to what extent the
presence of non-profit organizations producing personal, social and community
care services can help to create new employment. For this purpose, the model
presented here compares the employment and welfare implications of two
institutional frameworks: in the first of them all firms – both in the manufacturing
and in the service sector – are assumed to be for-profit organizations, while in the
second only the manufacturing firms are for-profit since those operating in the
service sector are assumed to be non-profit organizations. A satisfactory analysis of
this sort requires a general equilibrium set-up, since a change in the nature of the
organizations operating in a large sector of the economy has important allocative
and distributive effects that cannot be studied in the partial equilibrium set-up
generally used by the literature on non-profit organizations.
In order to avoid the main objections set out above, it will be assumed in
the model that non-profit organizations must compete in the market: they supply
their services directly to private consumers and that they do not benefit either from
a privileged relationship with the public administration or from tax concessions.
Moreover, as already mentioned, they do not operate in the manufacturing sector,
                                                                                                                                                   
8but only deliver services – which is the sector, as a matter of fact, in which these
organizations are concentrated.2 It is also assumed that any comparative advantage
that these organizations may enjoy over for-profit firms does not depend on any
presumed lesser capacity of the latter to reassure consumers concerning the quality
of the services delivered.
In contrast, we admit that a non-profit organization may enjoy a
comparative advantage over a for-profit firm because of its greater ability to
motivate employees. This greater ability have been explained by the fact that those
who work in this kind of organization may be more easily induced to share in its
mission: the “external social benefits generated by the firm employing the worker”
may play an important role in motivating the firm’s employees (see Preston, 1989;
Mirvis, 1992; Borzaga, 2000). However, the higher steady-state level of
employment obtained when service-producing firms are non-profit rather than for-
profit does not depend on the possible motivational advantage enjoyed by non-
profit organizations. The same applies to the larger quantity and (possibly) the
better quality of the services enjoyed by the consumers in the long-run equilibrium
obtained when the service-producing firms are non-profit. Indeed, the paper shows
that these outcomes depend on the different objectives and constraints of the two
types of organizations. On the contrary, the welfare implications of replacing for-
                                                          
2 Typically, the non-profit organizations operating in the health, education and social
services industries can be considered examples of the organizations modeled in the paper.
9profit firms with non-profit organizations in the service sector are sensitive to the
existence (and the importance) of this motivational advantage.
In fact, the elimination of the for-profit firms in the service sector also has
major redistributive effects, since (i) it suppresses a significant source of non-
labour income for the owners of these firms, (ii) it raises the number of wage
earners, thus increasing the labour share on total income, (iii) it raises the level of
work effort (care, attention) of those previously unemployed and (possibly) that of
all the other workers employed in the service sector, and (iv) it raises the long-run
equilibrium quantity and (possibly) quality of the services provided to consumers,
without affecting the output of the manufacturing sector. In this way, the model
captures the important redistributive role played by non-profit organizations,
thereby filling a void in the literature on the subject. Indeed, the paper shows that
any assessment of the welfare implications of a change in the nature of the firms
operating in the service sector must take account of these redistributive aspects. In
addition, it is shown that the shift from for-profit to non-profit organizations can
give rise to a Pareto improvement only when the motivational advantage enjoyed
by the non-profit organizations is not negligible.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2
is devoted to deriving the optimizing behaviour of the agents. In section 3 we
characterize the equilibrium paths of the economy, both for the case in which the
service-producing firms are for profit and the case in which they are non-profit.
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Section 4 compares the equilibrium paths emerging in the two cases, discussing
their redistributive and welfare implications. Section 5 contains a summary of the
main results of the paper and provides a brief comment.
1  THE MODEL
Let us consider an economy in discrete time with a constant population of
identical individuals -- whose large number is normalized to be one -- which
consume both a manufactured good xt and a service which may differ with respect
to its quality qt. The manufactured good is homogeneous and is produced by a
large number of perfectly competitive firms. Similarly, there is a large number of
firms which provide the service, whose quality depends on the effort and care of
their employees. In its turn, the workers' level of effort and care can be influenced
in the service sector by the incentives and ability of organizations to motivate their
members.
The manufacturing firms
The large number of firms producing the homogeneous consumer good xt
is normalized to be one. They produce according to the technology
 1,0 ,Sx tt <<= ξξ                                                                                       (1)
where St are the workers employed in period t by the representative firm producing
the consumer good. Since production is standardized, it requires a fixed level of
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effort et=ê to any single worker. In each t the representative firm chooses its labour
input in order to maximize its profit:
ttttt
m
t wSS)w,S( −== ξππ ,    (2)
where wt is the real wage paid to the firm's employees. Note that xt is not storable
and is taken to be the numéraire of this economy.
The service-producing firms
Also the large number of firms producing the consumer service is
normalized to be one. The units of the service that a firm provides in period t, Nt,
depend on the number of workers employed by the firm in that period, Lt:
1.0 ,L=N tt <<ζς      (3)
The quality of the service provided by the firm in period t, qt, depends on the effort
level et of its employees in that period:
qt=et.                                                                                                                (4)
Since the workers' effort is perfectly observable, the representative firm makes pay
contingent on the observed effort level:
vt=v(et),                                                                                                          (5)
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where vt is the wage paid by the firm to its employees in period t if their observed
effort level in that period is et.
In each t an individual buys the service that s/he wants to consume from
one single producer, which amounts to saying that in each period the consumer
selects a unique (perceived) quality level for the service that s/he wants to buy.
Consumers cannot observe qt ex ante (before they have purchased the service) and
they know that the quality of the service may vary across firms and time. On the
other hand, they are informed ex post about the quality of the service provided by
each firm. In particular, it is assumed that the perceived quality of the service
supplied in period t by a firm, qt
e , is based on its reputation, which depends on its
past performance in terms of quality:
given, q 1,0 ,)q-1(qq e01-t
e
1-t
e
t <<+= χχχ             (6)
where we assume for simplicity that χ =.5. Moreover, note that (6) entails both
0.t q=q if q=qlim and q=q if q=q t
e
t
t
1-t
e
i-t
e
1-t
e
t >∀••∞→  In other words, a
firm's reputation and the consumers' guess about the quality of its service do not
change if the quality level observed in the current period confirms what the
consumers expected; and this reputation tends asymptotically to be equal to the
observed level of quality if the latter remains constant forever, whatever the initial
firm's reputation may be.
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The price that a firm can charge for each unit of service depends on its
reputation for quality:
p = (q )t t
ep ,            (7)
where the "hedonic" function p( )qt
e  is given to any single firm.
Thus, the period profit function of a service-producing firm is:
ttt
e
ttt
e
t
s
t Lv)L(q)v,L,q( −== ςππ p .                      (8)
Individuals as consumers and workers in for profit and non-profit firms
If yt is the total income of an individual in period t, we have:
,)Nq(xy t
e
ttt p+≥         (9)
where the hedonic function p( )qt
e  is given to any single consumer.
The period utility that an individual obtains by consuming the service is
separable between the units Nt and the quality qt of the service that s/he buys:
1.0 1,0 ,q+N=)q,N( tttt <<<< βαβαg                      (10)
Separability is assumed in (10) in order to simplify the analysis, in the light of the
fact that both opposite cases can be plausible: the case in which the increment in
utility obtainable by consuming an additional unit of the service is larger as the
quality of the service is relatively low (quantity tends to substitute for quality), and
the case in which consuming more units has a larger impact on utility as the quality
of the service is high (quantity and quality tend to be complement).
The household’s total income is given by
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,ddhy st
m
ttt ++=                             (11)
where ht is the household’s labour income, 
m
td  is the household’s share of the
manufacturing firms’ total profits, and std  is the household’s share of the service-
producing firms’ total profits in period t. The household’s labour income is given
by:



=
firm. producing-servicea  in eeffort   with worksindividual  theif )e(=v
(12)                                firm ingmanufactura  in  worksindividual  theif  w
employednot  is individual  theif     0
h
ttt
tt
v
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that all households are
entitled to receive an equal share of the manufacturing firms’ profits:
m
t
m
td π= .          (13)
In contrast, we assume that only a proportion ks of total population is entitled to
receive an equal share of the profits generated by the service-producing firms:



≤<
=
                                                                                  .1k0  otherwise,  0
firms producing-service  by the generated profits receives individual  theif  
kd
s
s
s
t
s
t
π
(14)
An individual has a period utility function that is quasi-linear:
,n ,=i ),i,ef()q,g(Nxu ttttt ππ−+=                     (15)
where f(et,i), which captures the disutility of being employed in a firm instead of
staying at home, gives the minimum wage for which an individual is willing to
work at an effort level et in a for-profit firm (i=π) or in a non-profit firm (i=nπ):
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


≥=
.firm producing-servicea  in teeffort   with worksindividual  theif tei
1  ),eˆ=t(e firm ingmanufactura  in  worksindividual  theif eˆ
(16)                                  0)=t(e employednot  is individual  theif  0
i),f(et
γη
γγπη
Since we attribute a non-monetary objective to the non-profit organizations, they
may be more able than the profit-seeking enterprises to motivate their employees
also by means of non-monetary incentives. Indeed, such organizations may at least
partly share their ‘mission’ with their workers, who may be willing to work at the
same effort level but for lower pay than the employees of a for-profit firm. In other
words, a non-profit firm may motivate its workers by relying on a mix of self-
interest and a genuine desire to help in achieving the common goals of the
organization. Thus, we assume that ηπ≥ηnπ >0.
The problem that the an individual has to solve in each t is the following:
∑∞
=
+ ≡
0j
1-
jt
j
e,N,q
0,>r ,r)+(1 ,umax
ttt
θθ                                                           (17)
where r is the (exogenously given) interest rate, subject to the information
asymmetry implying that a firm's reputation for quality qte  signals the ‘true’ level
of quality embodied in the service offered by that firm, and subject to the period
budget constraint (9). For simplicity and without loss of generality, the discount
rate is assumed to be equal to the inverse of  1+r.
The utility function implicitly implies that the service satisfies a basic need.
Even if some household is unemployed in t, s/he receives a share of the firms’
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profits (thanks to his/her property rights or to a redistributive policy), which allows
him/her to devote any additional income to increasing his/her consumption of xt:
for all households and in all periods, the demand for the service is independent of
the level of income, and the consumption of xt is strictly positive.
Objectives of firms operating in the service sector: for profit versus non-profit
We consider two alternative settings which differ with respect to the goals
and organizational arrangements of firms operating in the service sector. In the first
setting the representative firm seeks to maximize profits, while in the second the
representative firm seeks to maximize the discounted sequence of utilities that an
individual can obtain by consuming its service.
In each period, a for-profit firm chooses its wage and labour policy in order
to maximize its value, i.e. its discounted sequence of profits:
∑∞
=
+
0j
s
jt
j
L,v
,max
tt
πθ                     (18)
subject to (3)-(8).
In contrast, a possible formulation of the problem for a non-profit
organization might be the following:
,)q,g(Nmax
0=j
j+tj+t
j
L,v tt
∑∞ θ          (19)
subject to (3)-(8) and to the intertemporal budget constraint
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∑∞ ≥+
0=j
s
j+t
j- .0r)1( π           (20)
It should be emphasized that (20) must be satisfied if the firm wants to
continue operating: the non-profit organization must be able to finance its
operations in the marketplace without making systematic losses. The presence of
competition among non-profit firms enables consumers to choose the most
favourable combination of quality and prices, inducing the organizations to
optimize their operations in order to survive. Indeed, also a non-profit organization
has an incentive to raise its revenues in order to increase the quantity and improve
the quality of the service that it provides. In particular, a quality improvement
entails a cost increase which may conflict with the organization's interest in
balancing its intertemporal budget constraint. Therefore, even non-profit firms are
faced by a reputation problem vis-à-vis the consumers: in itself, the fact that an
organization is oriented toward the maximization of the welfare that a consumer
can obtain from its service does not provide the consumer with a guarantee about
the quality of the service that s/he pays for. Finally, one should consider that the
objective of maximizing the consumer's welfare coincides with the managers'
interest in increasing the economic value of the organization's activities: they can
exert  constant control on a larger amount of resources by providing more units of
the service and improving its quality without jeopardizing the long-term survival of
the organization.
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Market equilibrium conditions
It is straightforward from (9)-(17) that the necessary conditions for
inducing an individual to work in a manufacturing firm or in a service-producing
firm with an effort level et  are, respectively,
wt- 0eˆ ≥γπη ,         (21a)
and
,n,=i ,0e-)e( tit ππη γ ≥v       (21b)
where  the optimal effort level of the worker depends on the incentive wage
scheme of the firm and its organizational form (for-profit versus non-profit).
Assuming perfect labour mobility between the manufacturing and the
service segments of the labour market, equilibrium requires
.n,i  ,e-)e(eˆ-w titt ππηη γγπ == v                    (21c)
If  wt-
γ
πη eˆ = γη tit e-)e(v >0, each household strictly prefers working rather than
remaining at home and the equilibrium is necessarily characterized by full
employment. Indeed, if there are unemployed workers, they apply downward
pressure on wages in both labour markets, and they raise the effort that the workers
are willing to make in the service sector for any given pay level, up to the point
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where γγπ ηη titt e-)e(eˆ-w v= =0. Therefore, the presence of unemployment
implies that at equilibrium γγπ ηη titt e-)e(eˆ-w v= =0: an unemployment
equilibrium (S + Lt t <1) is a situation in which the optimizing firms do not create
enough jobs to employ the entire workforce, even if the employed workers do not
enjoy any rent.
An equilibrium quantity of the manufactured good is such that
d
t
s
t x=x .        (22)
The equilibrium price of the service p qt t
e= p( )  must be such that at that
price both the units of the service supplied are equal to the units demanded and the
reputation for quality of the service-producing firms is equal to the quality level
demanded by the representative consumer:
,N=N dt
s
t         (23)
and
d
t
e
t qq = .         (24)
2   THE OPTIMIZING BEHAVIOR OF THE AGENTS
Households
         Maximizing (17), we obtain the conditions that the consumers' demand for
the service must satisfy for optimality:
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1-
t
e
t N=)(q
ααp    (25a)
and
1-
tt
e
t qN)q('
ββ=p ,         (25b)
and the condition that the effort level of a household must satisfy if s/he works in a
service-producing firm:
v ' ( ,e ) = e  i = , nt i t
-1γη π πγ .                                   (25c)
It is evident that the rule applied by an optimizing household to decide whether to
work and --possibly-- in what type of firm to work produces the conditions (21).
Equation (25a) states that for optimality the price charged for one
additional unit of the service characterized by the (perceived) quality level desired
by the consumer must be equal to the marginal increase in utility obtainable with
this additional consumption. Equation (25b) establishes  that -- along an optimal
path --the increment in expenditure that a consumer is willing to incur for a
marginal improvement in the (perceived) quality of the units of the service that s/he
intends to buy must be equal to the additional utility brought about by this
improvement. Finally, equation (25c) states that the optimal level of effort by a
worker employed in a service-producing firm must be such that a marginal
increment in the effort level causes an increase in disutility equal to the increase in
pay that the worker can receive thanks to this additional effort.
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Manufacturing firms
For optimality, the manufacturing firms equalize the value of the marginal
productivity of labour to the market wage:
ξ ξS wt -1 t= .                                                                                                        (26a)
From this condition one can easily obtain the optimal demand for labour of
the manufacturing firms:
S w
wt t t
= = −S ( ) .( ) ( )ξ ξ1 1                    (26b)
Service-producing firms as for profit organizations
Maximizing the Hamiltonian
H= θt
t=0
∞∑ 







 +
+ 2
)q(e-q-)Le(-)Lq(
e
tte
1ttttt
e
t λζ vp  with respect to Lt, et and qt+1e ,
and eliminating the multiplier λt, we obtain the following conditions that an
optimal path must satisfy:
ζ ζp v(q )L (e ),te t-1 t=                              (27a)
L e ) = L q L e )t t t+1 t+1
e
t+1 t+1v p v' ( ' ( ) ' (θ θ
ζ +
2
.                                   (27b)
An optimal path must also satisfy equation (6) and the transversality
condition
lim L e )q
t
t
t t t
e
→∞ =θ 2 0v ' ( .                 (27c)
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Finally, the optimal wage scheme of the service-producing firm must
satisfy (21c), taking into account that optimal workers’ behaviour entails (21b) and
(25c).
The condition (27a) equalizes the value of the marginal productivity of
labour at the optimal effort level to the wage that must be paid to generate that
level of effort. Condition (27b) captures the intertemporal trade-off that the firm
has to face: together with (27c), it states that along an optimal path the additional
labour cost incurred in the current period by the firm to marginally improve the
quality of all the units produced must be equal to the discounted increment in
future revenues due to the higher prices that it will be able to charge on all the units
of its service thanks to its improved reputation. In other words, its reputation for
quality can be considered the only asset owned by a firm, and along an optimal
path the current value of this asset must be equal to the discounted sequence of
additional revenues that the firm can obtain from a marginal improvement in its
reputation.
Service-producing firms as non-profit organizations
A non-profit organization operating in the marketplace must satisfy its
intertemporal budget constraint, but it may run current budget decifits and
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surpluses3. This fact can be captured by writing the dynamic budget constraint of
the non-profit firm as
D = (1 + r)D - q )L + e )Lt+1 t t
e
t t tp v( ( ,
ζ                                                        (28)
where Dt is the debt of the firm in period t. Consistently with (20) we must have
both D0=0 and lim D r)t t
-t
→∞ + ≤(1 0 . Thus, we can  maximize the Hamiltonian
H= θt
t=0
∞∑ [ ] 






 +++ + 2
)q(e-q-)Le(-)Lq(+r)D+(1-DeL
e
tte
1ttttt
e
tt1+tttt λσ ζβαζ vp
with respect to Lt, et , qt+1
e  and Dt+1. By eliminating the multiplier λt, we obtain
the following conditions that an optimal path must satisfy:
σ
αζζ
αζ
ζ
~
L)e(L)q(
1-
t
t
1-
t
e
t −= vp       (29a)
and
,~2
e
2
)e('L)q('L
~
e=)e('L
1-
1+t1+t1+t
e
1+t1+t
1-
t
tt σ
θβθθ
σ
β βζβ −++ vpv                      (29b)
where along an optimal path " ~("t   ,0
L~)q~(-)e~(
L~~
1-e
1-
t1t ∀>===+ ζ
αζ
ζ
αζσσσ
pv
denotes the steady-state value of a variable as firms are non-profit in the service
sector).
                                                          
3 If in t a non-profit firm makes a temporary profit (loss), )0( 0dst <>  and a proportion
ks of the households reduce (increase) their net credit toward the service firms.
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In fact, an optimal path must also satisfy equation (6), and the
transversality conditions
0]qe-)e('L~[2lim et
1-
ttt
t
t
=∞→
ββσθ v                                 (29c)
and
.0D~lim t
t
t
=∞→ σθ      (29d)
Again, the optimal wage scheme of the service-producing firm must
satisfy (21c), taking into account that optimal workers’ behaviour entails (21b) and
(25c).
Comparing (27) and (29), one can see the differences in optimizing
behaviour between the for profit firm and the non-profit organization.
The non-profit firm does not equalize the value of the marginal
productivity of labour at the optimal effort level to the wage that must be paid to
generate the optimal effort level, since it also cares about the additional benefit that
the representative household can obtain in the current period from a marginal
increase in the units of the service. This current benefit has more weight in the
optimal decision-making of the firm when in its optimal plan the firm attributes a
smaller (time-invariant) value to the discounted sequence of future marginal benefit
obtainable by the consumers thanks to a small improvement in the firm's current
balance sheets. In other words, the smaller ~σ  is, which captures the concern that
the firm must have for the future implications for its ‘mission’ of more ‘generous’
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financial behaviour in the current period, the more the firm's current employment
policy differs from the policy that would be optimal for a profit-maximizing firm.
Furthermore, the non-profit organization does not equalize the additional
labour cost incurred in the current period because of a marginal improvement in the
quality of all the units produced to the discounted increment in future revenues due
to the higher prices that it will be able to charge on all the units of its service thanks
to its improved reputation. Indeed, the non-profit firm’s optimal plan must also
take account of the beneficial impact on the current consumers’ welfare due to the
improvement in the quality of its service taking place in the current period. Again,
the smaller ~σ is, the more the firm's current policy on quality differs from the
policy that would be optimal for a profit maximizing firm. In other words, the non-
profit organization equalizes the additional labour cost that it must incur in the
current period in order to achieve a marginal improvement in the quality of all the
units produced to the discounted sequence of additional revenues that the firm can
obtain by a marginal improvement in its reputation plus the current marginal
benefit accruing to the consumers because of the better quality of the service
(weighted by the inverse of ~σ ).
Finally, one should consider that the optimal wage scheme of a non-profit
firm internalizes the possible advantage in terms of workers' non-monetary
motivations that this type of organization may enjoy.
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3 THE EQUILIBRIUM PATHS
Manufacturing sector
The presence of unemployment in period t implies that the wage at which
the manufacturing firms would employ all the workers who do not work in a
service-producing firm is strictly below the minimum wage at which a worker is
willing to work in a manufacturing firm: even at γπη eˆ=w t  some worker remains
unemployed. Thus, in the presence of unemployment, the employment level of the
manufacturing sector must be such that
 
)1(
1
t eˆ
S=S
ξ
γπη
ξ −



= <1 Lt− ,         (30)
where we have used the optimal labour demand (26b), and where
γπη eˆw=w t = .         (31)
The presence of full employment in period t implies that the wage at which
the manufacturing firms are induced to employ all the workers who do not work in
a service-producing firm is larger than or equal to the minimum wage at which a
worker is willing to work in a manufacturing firm. Thus,
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from which we obtain that
γπξ ηξ eˆ)L-(1=)(Lw 1-ttt ≥= w .                               (33)
Note that the wage that clears the labour market of the manufacturing sector
increases with the employment level of the service sector. Indeed, the labour
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supply of the manufacturing sector shrinks as more people are employed in the
service sector, thus exerting upward pressure on wt.
The dynamics when the service-producing firms are for profit
When the service-producing firms are for-profit, equations (4), (6), (23),
(24), (25), (27), (31) and (33) can be used to obtain the system of difference
equations in ett q and L  governing the equilibrium path of the economy:
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Apparent in (34) is the negative relationship linking the employment level and the
effort level of the workers (and thus, the quality level of the service) along an
equilibrium path. Moreover, no link exists between the manufacturing sector and
the service sector in the presence of unemployment.
In contrast, in the presence of full employment, both the effort level and
the wage rate prevailing in the service sector depend on the conditions of the labour
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market in the manufacturing sector, which in their turn are affected by tL : since
 ,eeˆ-)L-(1v t
1-
tt
γπγπξ ηηξ += the optimal wage scheme must offer higher pay
for any effort level as employment in the service sector increases. A similar effect
is brought about by a reduction of the (standardized) disutility of working in a
manufacturing firm (lower eˆ ): in the presence of full employment, an
improvement of the working conditions in the manufacturing sector tends to
increase the monetary compensation that is necessary to induce the workers of the
service sector to provide a given level of effort.
By setting et
e
+1t
e
t+1t q=q=q and L=L=L , one can solve (34) for the
steady states of this economy. In a steady state characterized by unemployment we
have:
0 ,0  ),,,,,,(eq=qe <<== πηθπ ζγβαηθ eee ,4                 (35a)
(the bar "   " denotes the steady-state value of a variable as firms are for-profit),
)-1(
1
e
=L
αζ
η
αζ
γ
π




,                (35b)
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and (30)-(31). This steady state characterized by unemployment exists if and only
if mineˆeˆ > , where ),,,,,,(eˆmin ζξηγθβα πm= is that value of eˆ satisfying
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 (if mineˆeˆ = , there is full employment): there is
structural unemployment if the minimum wage required by the households to work
in a manufacturing firm is so high relatively to the other parameters’ values that the
service-producing firms are unable to absorb all the workers left unemployed by
the manufacturing firms.
It is easy to check that 0>θm : one can see in (35) that, as the agents
discount the future less heavily because of a lower interest rate ( ↑θ ), the steady-
state level of the effort (and the steady-state level of the quality of the service)
decreases, thus increasing the steady-state level of employment. A lower interest
rate raises the threshold which the wage paid in the manufacturing sector cannot
exceed without creating structural unemployment. In fact, as the future increments
in firms' profits resulting from an additional investment in quality are discounted
less heavily, firms tend to invest up to a point at which the marginal cost of their
investment is higher. This is implemented by enlarging the workforce to which a
current marginal increase in pay can apply. This effect dominates the reduction in
the marginal cost of a quality improvement due to the lower level of quality at
which the firms operate. As a result, a larger θ  brings about a higher steady-state
level of employment and activity in the service sector (number of units produced),
associated with a lower quality and effort level and with a lower price of the
service.
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Since the same effort level is associated with more disutility )( ↑πη ,
0<πηm : we have in (35) that both the steady-state level of employment and the
effort level in the service sector decline. Considering (30)-(31), it is apparent that a
larger πη  has a depressing impact on total steady-state employment also by raising
the minimum wage at which the workers are willing to work in a manufacturing
firm (note that a similar effect on S is caused by an increase in ê).
One can check that the system obtained by linearizing (34) around its
steady state (35) exhibits saddle-path stability5: the linearized system characterizes
a unique path converging to the steady state with unemployment. Moreover, the
existence of a steady state with unemployment entails the existence of a full-
employment steady state which tends to be dynamically unstable (see the
Appendix). Indeed, the interdependence between the labour markets of the two
sectors in the presence of full employment creates a potential for dynamic
instability, owing to the fact that a small deviation of Lt from its (full-employment)
steady-state value tends to cause a relatively large movement of et in the opposite
direction. Indeed, a higher (lower) employment level in the service sector is
associated with both a lower (higher) vt and a reduced (expanded) labour supply in
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the manufacturing sector, which pushes wt upwards (downwards). Thus, the effort
level must decline (increase) considerably in the service sector, since otherwise the
firms operating in this sector cannot attract more (less) workers in spite of the
lower (higher) vt. In its turn, this sharp fall (increase) in et causes a dramatic
quality deterioration (improvement) in the current period, thus leading to a rapid
decline (rise) in the reputation of the service-producing firms. In the proximate
future, the consumers’ willingness to pay for an improvement in the perceived
quality of the service will be high (low), so that the firms will be induced to opt for
a combination of higher (lower) quality and decreased (increased ) quantity,
implying higher (lower) wages and a lower (higher) employment level in the
service sector. This will trigger a movement in the opposite direction, giving rise to
fluctuations that become more violent as time passes: as mineˆeˆ > , one can check
for reasonable parameters’ values that explosive cycles characterize the dynamics
of the system obtained by linearizing (34) around its full-employment steady state
(see the Appendix).
The dynamics when the service-producing firms are non-profit
When the service-producing firms are non-profit, equations (4), (6), (23),
(24), (25), (29), (31) and (33) can be used to obtain the system of difference
equations in ett q and L  governing the equilibrium path of the economy:
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By comparing (34) and (36), one finds that for any given effort level, the
employment level tends to be higher as the firms operating in the service sector are
non-profit. This is due to the fact that the objective function of the non-profit firms
increases with the quantity and the quality of the service that they are able to
provide to the consumers.
By setting et
e
+1t
e
t+1t q=q=q and L=L=L , one can solve (36) for the
steady states at which the debt of the non-profit firms is not distant from the initial
condition )D~0=(D0 = . In a steady state characterized by unemployment we
have:
33
0~  ,0~  ),,,,,,(~e~q~=q~
nn
e <<== πηθπ ζγβαηθ eee 6,   (37a)
)-1(
1
e~
=L~
n
αζ
η
α
γπ 





,                  (37b)
γπη e~=v~ n                    (37c)
and (30)-(31). This steady state characterized by unemployment exists if and only
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Again, one can check that linearizing (36) around (37) the system thus
obtained exhibits saddle-path stability.7 Moreover, also in the case in which the
service-producing firms are non-profit, the existence of a steady state with
unemployment entails the existence of a full-employment steady state that tends to
be dynamically unstable (see the Appendix). The reasons for this dynamic
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instability are similar to those discussed for the case in which all firms are profit
maximizers.
4       COMPARING THE EQUILIBRIUM PATHS
Comparison between the steady-state levels of employment, quality and income
We focus only on the steady states characterized by unemployment, since
the economy exhibits the tendency to move away from the full-employment steady
state both in the case in which the service-producing firms are for-profit and in the
one in which they are non-profit. Comparing (35) and (37), one can check that
L L~ >  even if ππ ηη n= . Even without relying on their possibly greater ability to
motivate the workers, the non-profit organizations – which seek to maximize the
discounted sequence of utilities that the representative household can obtain from
their service —can satisfy their intertemporal budget constraint while employing
more people than the profit-maximizing firms. Therefore, in the presence of non-
profit organizations, the wage paid in the manufacturing sector may be higher
without creating structural unemployment (in fact, (.)(.)~ mm >  even if
ππ ηη n= ). These results, which do not depend on the alleged superiority of non-
profit organizations in dealing with asymmetry in information on quality with
respect to the consumers, are reinforced admitting that ππ ηη n> .
Furthermore, the fact that L L~ >  can be consistent with qq~ >  and vv~ > :
the steady-state level of quality and the steady-state wage of the service-producing
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firms may be higher, as the latter are non-profit rather than for-profit.8 In other
words, non-profit firms not only produce more units of the service employing more
people, but they may also offer a combination of better quality and increased
quantity, guaranteeing their long-term survival in the marketplace, i.e., satisfying
their intertemporal budget constraint.
Finally, note that at steady state aggregate income is higher in the presence
of non-profit firms: ζζ )L)(e(x)L~)(e~(x pp +>+ , where 
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. The
loss in income due to the fact that the households do not receive any profit from the
service-producing firms is more than compensated by the increase in labour income
due to the enlarged employed workforce.
Welfare implications
A regime shift in the service sector from profit-maximizing firms ( π=i )
to non-profit organizations ( πni = ) leads to an increase in the share of labour
income on aggregate income. In the presence of inequalities in the distribution of
non-labour income, the effects of this shift on the steady-state welfare of an
individual depend on whether s/he obtains a portion of the service-producing firms’
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profits in the steady state with π=i . In particular, we can state the following
proposition:
Proposition (i) If we ignore the possible advantage of the non-profit organizations
in motivating their workers (i.e., if we assume that ππ ηη n= ), and if there are
households which are not entitled to receive the profits of the service-producing
firms (i.e., if we assume that ks<1), then ia) these households tend to be better off
in the steady state emerging when  the service-producing firms are non-profit (i.e.,
in the steady state characterized by (37)) rather than in the steady state emerging
when all firms are profit maximizers (i.e., in the steady state characterized by
(35)), while ib) those receiving an equal share of sπ  tend to be worse off in (37)
rather than in (35) (see the Appendix).
The intuition underlying proposition (i) is simply that the households
receiving the smaller share of non-labour income (for instance, because of an
unequal distribution of property rights, or because of the lack of a tax policy
redistributing income in favour of those with fewer assets) tend to prefer the
framework in which the service-producing firms are non-profit, while the opposite
is true for the “richer” portion of the total population. However:
Proposition (ii) If we assume that ππ ηη n= , but also assume that all households
receive an equal share of the firms’ profits (i.e., if  ks=1), then each household is
better off along the equilibrium path (34) (i.e., if  i=π ) rather than along (36) (i.e.,
if  i=nπ ) (see the Appendix).
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One can paraphrase proposition (ii) by stating that a society which is
egalitarian in terms of  distribution of non-labour income, and in which people are
not particularly motivated to undertake non-profit activities, should not display any
preference for non-profit rather than profit-maximizing firms. Moreover:
Proposition (iii) If again ππ ηη n=  and ks<1 as in proposition i), then a regime
shift in the service sector from i=π  to i=nπ  is Pareto dominated by an
egalitarian redistribution of the claims on the firms’ profits which safeguards the
profit-seeking nature of all firms (see the Appendix).
Again, if people are not more motivated when involved in a non-profit
activity than when they are employed in a profit-seeking enterprise, an egalitarian
redistribution of property rights (or, more generally, an egalitarian profit
redistribution) is a better policy than a regime shift from profit to non-profit firms
in the service sector.
One should not neglect the welfare implications of the possible greater
ability of the non-profit organizations to motivate those working for them. Indeed:
Proposition (iv) If the comparative advantage of the non-profit organizations in
motivating their workers ( ππ ηη n> ) is sufficiently large, then (37) is always
Pareto superior to (35) in the presence of  transfers compensating those who may
lose in the shift  from (35) to (37) (see the Appendix).
Note that these transfers are not necessary for the Pareto improvement if
ks is sufficiently close to 1 (i.e., if the distribution of the profits generated by the
service-producing firms is not concentrated).
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5 CONCLUSIONS
Also for non-profit organizations—as for profit-maximizing firms—it is
costly to increase the quantity and to improve the quality of the service that they
provide. However, the different objectives of the two types of organization give
rise to different optimizing behaviours. Indeed, a for-profit firm equalizes the value
of the marginal productivity of labour (as the workers’ effort is at its optimal level)
to the wage that must be paid to generate this optimal effort level. In contrast, a
non-profit organization tends to operate with more people, thus pushing the value
of the marginal productivity of labour downwards, because it also takes account of
the marginal benefit that the representative household can obtain in the current
period from an additional unit of the service. The amplitude of this deviation from
the employment policy that would be optimal for a profit-maximizing firm meets a
limit in the concern that the non-profit firm must show as regards the future
implications for its ‘mission’ of an excessively ‘generous’ behaviour in the present,
causing its balance sheets to deteriorate. Similarly, a non-profit organization
deviates from the quality policy that would be optimal for a profit-maximizing
firm: the former does not equalize the additional cost incurred in the current period
by increasing its workers’ effort and improving the quality of its service (as the
employed workforce is at its optimal level) to the present value of the additional
revenues that it can obtain in the future by improving its reputation, since also the
marginal benefit accruing to the consumers thanks to the better quality of its
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service is taken into account. Again, the non-profit organization is aware that an
excessive financial effort to improve the quality of its service in the present may
undermine its future ability to carry out its mission.
Given these different optimizing strategies, a shift from an institutional
framework in which the service-producing firms are for-profit to a framework in
which they are non-profit increases the steady-state employment level of the
service sector, even if non-profit organizations are no better at motivating workers
through non-monetary incentives. This raises aggregate employment and reduces
unemployment, since the economy tends to stabilize around steady states
characterized by unemployment and to move away from full-employment steady
states. Moreover, households can benefit from the increased quantity and (possibly)
from the better quality of the services that they consume.
In the presence of unemployment, the manufacturing sector is not affected
by the increased volume of activity in the service sector brought about by the non-
profit firms, since (i) the additional manpower employed by the non-profit
organizations was unemployed when the service-producing firms were for-profit,
(ii) the wage in the manufacturing sector remains unchanged, and (iii) the
additional demand for the service is financed by the increased income generated in
the service sector. This increased income resulting from a change of regime in the
service sector from profit-maximizing firms to non-profit organizations is
associated with a larger share of labour income on total income, due to both a
reduction in the volume of distributed profits and to an increase in the mass of
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wages. Also the steady-state wage paid to the workers in the service sector may be
higher when firms are non-profit, thus raising the associated steady-state level of
the service quality even in the absence of a non-profit firms’ advantage at
motivating workers.
In evaluating the welfare implications of a regime shift from profit-
maximizing firms to non-profit organizations in the service sector, one should
consider the distribution of  non-labour income among individuals, which may be
determined by the firms’ shares owned by households or by some redistributive
policy. Ignoring the possible advantage to non-profit firms in motivating workers
through non-monetary incentives, households receiving a smaller share of the non-
labour income tend to be better off in the steady state to which the economy can
converge when the service-producing firms are non-profit, while the opposite is
true for households receiving a larger share of the non-labour income. Under these
circumstances, however, the regime shift is Pareto-dominated by an egalitarian
redistribution of the non-labour income, which keeps the profit-seeking nature of
the service-producing firms unchanged. By contrast, the steady state to which the
economy can converge when the service-producing firms are non-profit is Pareto
superior to the steady state to which the economy can converge when all firms are
profit maximizers, if  the non-profit organizations enjoy an important comparative
advantage because of their greater ability to motivate workers by means of non-
monetary incentives.
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The tendency of the non-profit organizations to employ more people than
the profit-maximizing firms may be consistent with the argument that economies
characterized by firms whose objectives did not coincide with profit maximization
(e.g. Japan) exhibited a lower natural rate of unemployment. Indeed, an optimal
rule implying that the value of the marginal product of labour is pushed below the
cost of an additional worker is also applied by capitalist firms whose managers
seek to increase their volume of activity and treat the minimum rate of return that
must be guaranteed for their shareholders as a constraint. Since labour is not scarce
and workers are not subtracted from other productive uses, the existence of some
sector(s) adopting this kind of behavioural rule is likely to reduce the number of
workers that are involuntarily unemployed. It is a matter of dispute whether this
reduction leads to a Pareto improvement.
A natural extension of the model presented here is to allow for the
coexistence of profit-maximizing firms and non-profit organizations competing in
the service sector. The derivation of the resulting steady-state equilibrium, entailing
different combinations of price and quality for the service, will be the subject of a
future study.
APPENDIX
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1  Proof, for the case in which all firms are for-profit, that the existence of a steady
state with unemployment entails the existence of a full-employment steady state
that is locally unstable
By setting 1tt L LL +==  and e 1tete qqq +==  in (34), we obtain the system of
equations that a (full-employment) steady state must satisfy:
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To see that the existence of a steady state with unemployment necessarily implies
the existence of a full-employmnent steady state, consider that: (i) the steady-state
value of the workforce employed in the service sector given by (35b), L , is that
value of L satisfying γπη L))(z(L)(v = ; (ii) v(L)-(z(L))γπη >0 for L< L  and
v(L)-(z(L))γπη <0 for L> L ; (iii) a steady state with unemployment exists if
and only if minmin eˆ   where,eˆeˆ >  is that value of eˆ)L( that  such eˆ =n , and  (iv)
the function n(L) is continuous in L for LL ≥  and is such that ∞→→ L)(lim1L n .
Together with the participation condition (21b), (i) and (ii) imply that in a full-
employment steady state the employment level of the service sector, fulL , must be
such that LLful ≥ , while (iii) and (iv) imply that for any finite value of mineˆeˆ >
there exists a value L<1 satisfying (A1). Therefore, we can conclude, considering
(iii), that if there is a steady state with unemployment, then there also exists fulL
satisfying (A1) such that .LLful >
The characteristic equation of the system obtained by linearizing (34) around the
(full-employment) steady state satisfying (A1) is the following:
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One can check that (A2a) entails 
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, which in its
turn implies that both characteristic roots are greater than unity in absolute value.
For instance, let ,5.== βα ξ=.25, ê=.62002 .9 and .8  ,1 ==== θζηγ π : one
has  e  Lful ful= =. , . ,266 7926  λ1=b+ic and λ2=b-ic, where b=.03674, c=1.0534
and i= -1 . The system is unstable since b c2 2+ = >−θ 1 1.
2     Proof, for the case in which the service-producing firms are non-profit,
that the full-employment steady state existing when mineˆeˆ >  is locally unstable
By setting et
e
1+t
e
t1+t q=q=q and L=L=L  in (36), we obtain the system of
equations that must be satisfied by a (full-employment) steady state at which the
debt of the non-profit firms is not far away from the initial condition
)D~0=(D0 = :
e=qe ,              (A3a)
eˆ=(L)χ , (A3b)
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 where ,
w(L)+(L)-(L))(
=(L)
1
n
γ
π
γπ
η
ϑεηχ




 1-L=v=(L) αζαϑ ,
)(
1
n L)-(2
)-)(1-2(=e=(L)
βγ
πζγηθ
ζθββθζε −

 +
 and 1-L)-(1=w= w(L) ξξ .
Following the same arguments used for the case in which the service-producing
firms are for-profit, one can show that the existence of (37) entails the existence of
a (full-employment) steady state satisfying (A3).
The characteristic equation of the system obtained by linearizing (37) around the
(full-employment) steady state satisfying (A3) is the following:
,01
L
(L)e~)-(1)-1(
L
(L)e~L~)1(e~
L
(L)
2
e~)-(1
2
12
fulful
ful
L~=L
2-
fulL~=L
2-
fulful
1-
fuln
L~=L
2-
ful
2
=+
+

 −+
+
+

 +−
θββζγζγη
ββλζ
λθλ
βγγπ
β
d
de
d
de
d
de
where 21  and λλ  are the characteristic roots. Moreover, since
0
L
L)(
2
2
>
d
d χ
 for L~L ≥ , it necessarily follows that
min
ful
eˆeˆ if  0
L~LL
L)( >>=d
dχ
.     (A2b)
One can check that (A2b) entails 
ful
ful
ful L
~)-(
e~
L~LL
L)(- βγ>=d
de
, which in its
turn implies that both characteristic roots are greater than unity in absolute value.
For instance, let ,5.== βα ξ=.25, ê=.62002 .9 and .8  ,1 ==== θζηγ π : one
has ,75.L~ ,5071.e~ fulful == λ1=b+ic and λ2=b-ic, where b=.5448976, c=.902329
and i= -1 . The system is unstable since b c2 2+ = >−θ 1 1.
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3   Proof of propositions i), ii), iii) and iv)
We need to establish some facts.
Fact 1: along the equilibrium paths governed, respectively, by (30)-(31) and (34),
and by (30)-(31) and (36), individual utilities may differ only with respect to the
amount of  firms’ profits received by each household.
This fact can be verified by using equations (9)-(16), (21c), (30) and (31) to obtain
the utility level that a household can achieve along an equilibrium path
characterized by unemployment:







++−=
++−+=
=
otherwise,  qNN)q()u(-
(A4)                  firms producing-service by the generatedprofit             
some  receives household  theif  qNN)q(
k
)u(
u
ttt
e
t
m
t
s
t
ttt
e
ts
s
tm
t
s
t
t
βα
βα
ππ
πππ
p
p
where t
e
t
m
t N)q(p>π  (even the unemployed workers can satisfy their basic
needs, i.e. , the manufacturing firms’ profits received by each individual are
sufficient to allow him/her to buy some xt even if s/he is unemployed and if s/he
does not obtain any stπ ).
Fact 2: along the equilibrium paths governed, respectively, by (30)-(31) and (34),
and by (30)-(31) and (36), the summation of the individual utilities is invariant
with respect to all income distributions which make it possible for each individual
to consume a strictly positive amount of xt in every t.
This fact can be verified by adding the utility functions of all households to obtain
,qNN)q(-U ttt
e
t
s
t
m
tt
βαππ +++= p (A5a)
where Ut is the summation of the individual utilities and t
e
t
m
t N)q(p>π . Note
that (A5a) can also be written as
.n ,i  ,qLLe-Seˆ-Si),q,e,L,U(S ttttitttttt ππηη βαζγγπξ =++= (A5b)
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Fact 3: the equilibrium paths of the economy do not depend on the income
distribution (again, for all distributions that guarantee all households at least that
minimum income with which to consume a strictly positive amount of xt in each t).
One can easily check that ks does not appear in (34) and (36).
Fact 4: the path characterized by (30)-(31) and (34) can be obtained from the
solution of the problem of a benevolent planner which maximizes the summation of
the discounted sequence of individual utilities, taking into account that consumers
base their (ex ante) assessment of the service quality on past experience (and
setting πηη =i ).
Maximizing the Hamiltonian
∑∞
=
+ 




 +


 +−−
0t
t
e
tt
e
tte
1tttttt
t )q-q(
2
)qe(q),q,e,L,U(S=H ρλπθ , where
U(.) is given by  (A5b), with respect to St, Lt, et, qt, tt
e
1t  and   ,q ρλ+ , and
eliminating the multipliers, one obtains (30)-(31) and (34).
From the four above facts one can establish the following proposition:
There is always a redistribution of stπ  across households such that with ππ ηη =n
each household is better off along the equilibrium path emerging when all firms
are profit maximizers.
In particular, the path with i=π  is Pareto superior to the path with i=nπ  if the
distribution is equalitarian (ks =1, so that all households have an equal level of
utility in every period along both equilibrium paths).
Propositions (ii) and (iii) are obvious implications of the proposition stated above.
Proposition (ia) is true since, in the absence of an appropriate redistribution,
θθ ˆ≥ , where 
ζζ
ζθ
αζαζ 2-1
)-1(2ˆ
)-(1
-
+
= , is a sufficient condition for having the
“poorer” households better off in the steady state (37). Indeed, one can use (25a)
and (A4) to write
βαβα ααππ qN)1(q~N~)1()(-u)~(-u~ +−−+−=− ss .  (A6)
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Given that NN~ > , θθ ˆ≥  is a sufficient (but not necessary!) condition for having
)(-u)~(-u~ ss ππ > since it entails qq~ ≥ .
Proposition (ib) is true, since with )(-u)~(-u~ ss ππ >  and[ ] )~(-u~U~)(uk)(-u)k-1(U ss sss πππ =>+=  we must have )(u)~(-u~ ss ππ < .
Indeed, it is worth noting that in (37) also the steady state utility of the households
‘richer’ because all firms are for-profit is equal to )~(-u~ sπ  (in (37) the service-
producing firms do not generate any profit).
As a numerical example showing that proposition (i) holds, let
,5.ks === βα , 1 nππ ηηγ === .8=ζ  and .9 =θ . In this case, we have
.71378ˆ => θθ , 0713.)(-u)~(-u~ =− ss ππ  .0066U~-U =  and
0846.)~(-u~)(u =− ss ππ .
One can check that proposition (iv) is true by letting ,5.== βα
,95. 1 n =<== ππ ηηγ  .8=ζ  and .9 =θ , thus obtaining 0.01139U-U~ >= .
If ks=1 (egalitarian profit distribution), which implies that all households reach an
equal utility level Uu =  when π=i  and an equal utility level U~u~ =  when
πni = , everybody is better off in the steady state (37) without any transfer. If
ks<1, income transfers can be made (following a regime shift from π=i  to
πni = ) in favour of those possibly losing out because of the foregone profits of
the service-producing firms, so that their welfare is not lower in (37) than in (35).
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